2025年第103期(总第1144期)

演讲主题：Cross-border e-commerce platform strategy design and analysis: Reselling versus agency

主讲人：肖浩汉 暨南大学智能科学与工程学院副教授

主持人：王玥 供应链管理与系统工程系讲师

活动时间：2025年12月25日（周四）09:00-10:30

活动地址: 管院大楼119教室

主讲人简介：

肖浩汉，暨南大学智能科学与工程学院工业工程系副教授。研究领域包括复杂交通系统建模、交通政策设计与分析、物流与供应链管理等，近期关注智慧停车、公共交通、客货共运、众包物流、跨境物流等主题。以第一和通讯作者身份在交通管理与物流管理领域的顶级及权威期刊发表十余篇论文，包括《Transportation Research Part A/B/C/E》、《Transport Policy》等。主持国家自然科学基金（青年）、广东省自然科学基金（面上、青年）、广东省普通高校重点领域专项、中国博士后科学基金（特别资助、面上）等国家级、省部级项目。

活动简介：

Considering a cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) market involving multiple players of a CBEC platform, the supplier, and consumers, where the CBEC platform integrates the cross-border logistics services to connect the supplier and consumers. To investigate whether the CBEC platform can effectively promote the CBEC service, we deploy the game-theoretic approach to formulate two business models with and without the CBEC platform. The model with the CBEC platform is designed by two channel strategies, namely, the reselling strategy and the agency strategy. The platform in the reselling strategy acts as a reseller and procures products from the supplier, while the platform in the agency strategy serves as a third-party entity to benefit the supplier for self-stores. Equilibrium results concerning the CBEC platform’s profit, the supplier’s profit, and consumer surplus can be derived from the two models. The merits of integrating CBEC services can be obtained by comparing the results of the two models. Results show that the model with the CBEC platform outperforms the model without the platform in terms of promoting the supplier’s profit and consumer surplus. Further findings regarding which channel strategy should be implemented for the CBEC platform can also be obtained. The reselling strategy should be chosen when the commission rate is low while the agency strategy should be chosen otherwise.